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1.  INTRODUCTION1 
Ancient Roman law was formal in the sense that it seldom looked behind the 
external manifestations of a legal act in order to determine its validity.2 The 
significance of this approach for compelled acts was later encapsulated in a 
famous phrase by Paulus: 
"Si metu coactus adii hereditatem, puto me heredem effici, quia 
quamvis si liberum esset noluissem, tamen coactus volui" ("If I have 
entered upon an inheritance whilst compelled by fear, I believe that I 
become heir, because, although I would have declined if I had a free 
choice, when compelled I still had the will to do it").3 
Thus, the mere fact that an heir was "compelled by fear" did not imply that he 
could dispute the validity of his formal decision to accept the inheritance. He 
exercised his will in making a choice and was bound by it. As Paulus would 
say, "voluntas coacta tamen voluntas est". It was only in the case of 
agreements such as emptio venditio and locatio conductio, which were 
enforced by bonae fidei actions, that the judge had authority to provide relief. 
He could take anything which relates to good faith into account when he made 
his judgement, and here the presence of metus or duress was obviously 
relevant. A person attempting to enforce an agreement concluded under 
compulsion could be defeated by an exceptio metus, which was inherent in 
 
1 Cf., generally, Von Lübtow, Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa gestum erit"; 
Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht; Schulz, "Die Lehre vom erzwungenen 
Rechtsgeschäft im antiken römischen Recht", 1922 (43) ZSS (RA), 171; Schulz, Classical 
Roman Law, pp. 600 sqq.; Levy, "Zur nachklassischen in integrum restitutio", 1951 (68) ZSS 
(RA) 398; Kupisch, In integrum restitutio und vindicatio utilis bei Eigentumsübertragungen 
im klassischen römischen Recht, pp. 123 passim; Kaser, "Zur in integrum restitutio, besonders 
wegen metus und dolus", (1977) 94 ZSS (RA), 123, Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 
227, 242. For an introductory overview see Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 651 
sqq. 
2 Cf. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 227, 242; Buckland, A Text-book of 
Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, p. 416. A notable exception was error. If induced by 
dolus, the dolus could indirectly affect the validity of the agreement (cf. Thomas, Textbook of 
Roman Law, p. 228). 
3 Paul. D. 4.2.21.5. For a detailed analysis of this text, which deals with the possibility 
that it could have been interpolated, cf. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 
84 sqq. 
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bonae fidei iudicia.4 Agreements such as the stipulatio, on the other hand, 
were not enforced by bonae fidei actions, but by actions which came to be 
termed stricti iuris. Here the judge's hands were tied: he was only able to take 
into account that which was provided for in the formula, and if nothing could 
be said about metus, he was powerless to provide relief.5 Reform was needed, 
and the ideal vehicle for such reform was the praetor. In this chapter the focus 
will primarily be on the way in which the praetor reformed the civil law by 
providing the actio quod metus causa and in integrum restitutio (propter 
metum) to the victim of compulsion. Attention will also be paid to certain 
other forms of relief to which the victim was entitled, namely remedies of 
property law and a particular stricti iuris action of the law of obligations called 
the condictio. 
2.  COMPULSION AND THE REMEDIES BASED ON METUS 
2.1  The formula Octaviana 
The first reform aimed at remedying the inability of the ius civile to 
provide adequate relief on grounds of metus was the inclusion of the formula 
Octaviana in the praetor's edict at about 71 B.C.6 Unfortunately, not much is 
known about this formula. Two texts of Cicero indicate that it dealt with 
auferre per vim aut metum or auferre per vim et metum,7 but these records are 
 
4 Cf. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 244, 488; Nicholas, An Introduction to 
Roman law, p. 176. If the defendant proved fraud or duress he could also reduce the damages 
awarded to the plaintiff without wholly absolving the defendant (cf. Pap. D. 19.1.41; Thomas, 
Textbook of Roman Law, p. 228). 
5 Cf. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, p. 245, n. 31; Thomas, Textbook of Roman 
Law, p. 228; Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, pp. 163, 176; Buckland, A Text-book 
of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, pp. 416 sq., 679 sqq. 
6 Cf. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 191 sq., 245 sqq.; Von 
Lübtow, Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa gestum erit", pp. 126 sqq. On the social 
conditions at the time which may have prompted this measure, cf. Zimmermann, The Law of 
Obligations, pp. 651 sqq. According to Kelly, moral philosophical considerations reflected in 
Aristotelian and Stoic teaching on will and intention underlay the introduction of this measure 
(A Short History of Western Legal Teory (Oxford, 1992), p. 53). 
7 The two texts are In Verr. II 3.65.152 ("Adventu L. Metelli praetoris ... aditum est ad 
Metellum; eductus est Apronius; eduxit vir primarius, C. Gallus senator, postulavit ab L. 
Metello, ut ex edicto suo iudicium daret in Apronium `Quod per vim aut metum abstulisset', 
quam formulam Octavianam et Romae Metellus habuerat et habebat in provincia") and ad. 
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somewhat cryptic and inconsistent. A major problem with the Ciceronian texts 
is the absence of a clear indication of the factual basis of relief. By this the 
methods used by the wrongdoer and the effect thereof on the victim are meant. 
It is therefore not surprising that a diversity of interpretations exists as to what 
these texts are supposed to mean. According to Carlo Alberto Maschi a 
distinction should be drawn between vis and metus as two separate grounds for 
relief: he uses a distinction which was developed in mediaeval law, namely 
between vis absoluta and vis compulsiva.8 Maschi then defines the word "vis" 
in the formula as vis absoluta, i.e. physical bodily force which completely 
excludes any exercise of will by the victim. Robbery is supposed to involve 
such violence. Metus, one the other hand, is defined as fear caused by vis 
compulsiva, i.e. through the "bending" of the will of the victim.9 Threats are a 
source of such fear. According to Maschi, it is only when specific measures 
were taken against robbery, namely the actio vi bonorum raptorum10 
(contained in an Edict of Lucellus dating from 76 B.C.), that the formula 
Octaviana no longer needed to be applied in cases of vis absoluta and was 
 
Quint. fratr. 1.1.7.21. ("Cogebantur Sullani homines quae per vim et metum abstulerant 
reddere"). The latter text indicates that the formula was aimed at assisting the recovery of 
illicit takings from Sulla's supporters (cf. Von Lübtow, Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa 
gestum erit", pp. 127). The generality of this statement makes it arguable that even in early 
Roman law collective persecution was covered by the metus remedies. 
8 On this distinction see Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 3 sqq., 
who refers to Azo, Summa in C. 2,19 (20) de his quae vi metusve causa gesta sunt, § in primis 
(Papiae, 1506; Torino, 1966), 38; Glossa ordinaria, gl. vi atroci ad D. 4.2.1, gl. non videor and 
per vim ad D. 4.2.9 pr.; Baldus de Ubaldis, Commentarius super Decretalibus, in c. quae 
causa, X, de his quae vi metusve causa fiunt, n. 6-7 (Lugduni 1551), f.171rb. 
9 See Carlo Alberto Maschi, Il diritto romano I. la prospettiva storica della 
giurisprudenza classica (2nd. ed., Milan, 1966), pp. 641 sq., 647 sqq., 651 sqq. (references 
obtained from Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 4 sqq.; Ebert, "Vi metusve 
causa", (1969) 86 ZSS (RA) 403, 404 and Kupisch, In integrum restitutio und vindicatio utilis 
bei Eigentumsübertragungen im klassischen römischen Recht, pp. 193 sqq.). This view was 
initially followed by Schulz, "Die Lehre vom erzwungenen Rechtsgeschäft im antiken 
römischen Recht", 1922 (43) ZSS (RA), 171, but subsequently rejected in his Classical 
Roman Law, p. 601. 
10 Other important measures were the leges repetundarum, which were specifically 
aimed against magistrates who enriched themselves by extorting bribes. Cf. Von Lübtow, Der 
Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa gestum erit", pp. 81 sq., 129 sqq.; Hartkamp, Der Zwang im 
römischen Privatrecht, pp. 251 sqq.; Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law, s.v. 
Repetundae. 
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restricted to the "active" part of vis compulsiva, with metus forming the 
"passive" part. In other words, the concepts vis and metus now formed a sort 
of hendiadys: when combined they expressed the notion of compulsion 
through threats, with vis being the ("active") act of threatening, and metus the 
("passive") effect on the victim.11 This view that vis and metus formed a 
hendiadys, has also been proposed by many other authors, most notably 
Schulz,12 but with a crucial difference: they are not in agreement with 
Maschi's view that the word vis in the formula Octaviana initially only applied 
to vis absoluta. According to them the hendiadys of vis and metus did not 
develop after the action against robbery was recognised. It was already present 
in the formula Octaviana. Thus, the formula never applied to vis absoluta, but 
only to vis compulsiva; or, as Schulz puts it, "fear caused by threat".13 Ebert 
also supports the view that the formula Octaviana did not apply to vis 
absoluta, but bases this view on entirely different reasons.14 He rejects the 
view that the words vis and metus form a hendiadys: according to him, these 
words rather deal with two ways of "bending" the will of a victim, namely 
through vis,15 which is defined as physical violence causing fear, and through 
metus, which relates to threats of future harm. However, this view has been 
subjected to criticism,16 and at present, it seems doubtful whether a clear 
 
11 See Maschi, Il diritto romano I. la prospettiva storica della giurisprudenza classica 
(2nd. ed., Milan, 1966), pp. 641 sqq. (references obtained from Ebert, "Vi metusve causa", 
(1969) 86 ZSS (RA) 403, 404 and Kupisch, In integrum restitutio und vindicatio utilis bei 
Eigentumsübertragungen im klassischen römischen Recht, pp. 193 sqq.). 
12 Schulz, Classical Roman Law, pp. 601 sq.; Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen 
Privatrecht, pp. 5 sqq., 16. Cf. Kupisch, In integrum restitutio und vindicatio utilis bei 
Eigentumsübertragungen im klassischen römischen Recht, p. 194, n. 312. 
13 Schulz, Classical Roman Law, p. 601. 
14 Ebert, "Vi metusve causa", (1969) 86 ZSS (RA) 403 at 407. 
15 Vis compulsiva is then supposed to be restricted to vis so defined (Ebert, "Vi metusve 
causa", (1969) 86 ZSS (RA) 403, 405 sqq., 408, 414). As Hartkamp points out, such usage of 
the term vis compulsiva is at variance with existing usage, which defines it as psychological 
compulsion irrespective of the method employed (Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, 
p. 13, n. 5). 
16 Cf. Kupisch, In integrum restitutio und vindicatio utilis bei Eigentumsübertragungen 
im klassischen römischen Recht, pp. 193 sqq.; on the distinction cf. also Hartkamp, Der 
Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 4 sq. 
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answer can be found. The Ciceronian texts alone give very little guidance: the 
word "auferre" could mean "to rob" or "to take by force", as well as "acquire 
as the fruits of some act".17 It could therefore be used in the context of vis 
absoluta (inasmuch as it encompasses robbery) as well as vis compulsiva. Use 
of both the expressions vis et metus and vis aut metus is further confusing: if 
only vis et metus were used there would be much more force in the argument 
that they should be interpreted as a hendiadys. The words could then be read 
together, and an interpretation of vis as a reference to vis absoluta would be 
untenable since it would render the reference to metus superfluous.18 After all, 
in cases of vis absoluta it is utterly irrelevant whether or not the victim 
experienced fear. Use of the expression vis aut metus again indicates that two 
different concepts could have been intended, and that a hendiadys does not 
exist. This again provides support for the views of Maschi and Ebert, albeit 
that they differ as to the exact meaning of vis. 
It is not only the field of application of the formula Octaviana which is 
heavily disputed: the exact nature of the relief it gave rise to is also unclear. 
From the words "reddere cogebantur" contained in one of Cicero's texts,19 it 
can be deduced that the formula was aimed at obtaining some form of 
restitution, but this is about as far as one can take it. Apparently a penal 
remedy, aimed at obtaining damages in fourfold, was available to pressurize 
the recipient into providing restitution,20 but whether one could only proceed 
against the wrongdoer, or also against a third party recipient, is unclear.21 
 
17 Von Lübtow, Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa gestum erit", pp. 127 sq.; Hartkamp, 
Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, p. 249. 
18 Cf. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, p. 249. 
19 Ad. Quint. fratr. 1.1.7.21. 
20 Von Lübtow, Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa gestum erit", p. 128; Hartkamp, Der 
Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, p. 249; Schulz, "Die Lehre vom erzwungenen 
Rechtsgeschäft im antiken römischen Recht, 1922 (43) ZSS (RA),171, 218; also see Kupisch, 
In integrum restitutio und vindicatio utilis bei Eigentumsübertragungen im klassischen 
römischen Recht, pp. 158 sqq. 
21 Cf. esp. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 253 sqq., who supports 
the idea of a claim against third parties, but also discusses the contrary opinion. 
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2.2  Hadrian's Edictum perpetuum 
Two centuries after the adoption of the formula Octaviana an important 
provision on metus, which is recorded in Ulp. D.4.2.1, was included in the 
Edictum perpetuum of Hadrian.22 It is the most important Roman legal text on 
metus and reads as follows:  
"Ait praetor: `Quod metus causa gestum erit, ratum non habebo'" 
("The praetor says: `What is done through fear I will not uphold'").23 
It is apparent that there has been a movement away from the expression "vis et 
metus", found in the formula Octaviana, to simply "metus". Ulpian provides 
the explanation that the reference to force ("vis") was later dropped because 
"anything which is done by unmitigated force may be held to be done through 
fear too".24 This indicates that the Edict did not encompass vis absoluta, but 
only vis compulsiva. In fact, if it encompassed vis absoluta, the contraction to 
metus would have been highly unlikely.25 It should be obvious, however, that 
it could never have been intended that the Edict applied whenever someone 
experienced any sort of fear.26 Where the fear is not caused by wrongful 
means, but flows from threatened force of legal proceedings,27 or is "rightfully 
applied by a magistrate in pursuance of an established law",28 no relief would 
 
22 Cf. Schulz, Classical Roman Law, p. 601 sq.; Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen 
Privatrecht, p. 193. 
23 Lenel reconstructed the formula as follows: "Si paret metus causa AmAm fundum 
q.d.a. NoNo mancipio dedisse q.d.r.a. neque plus quam annus est cum experiundi potestas fuit 
neque ea res arbitrio iudicis restituetur, q.e.r. erit, tantae pecuniae quadruplum iudex NmNm 
AoAo c.s.n.p.a" (Das Edictum perpetuum (2nd. ed., Leipzig, 1927), p. 112). 
24 Ulp. D. 4.2.1 (" ... quodcumque vi atroci fit, id metu quoque fieri videtur"). 
25 Cf. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, p. 7. According to him, Maschi 
regards the expression "... quodcumque vi atroci fit, id metu quoque fieri videtur" as 
interpolated "weil sie nicht in seine Theorie passen"(!). 
26 Maier, Prätorische Bereicherungsklagen, p. 95. 
27 Cf. C. 8.37.9.1 (Diocl. et Max.), C. 2.19.10 (Diocl. et Max.). 
28 Ulp. D. 4.2.3.1 ("Sed vim accipimus atrocem et eam, quae adversus bonos mores fiat, 
non eam quam magistratus recte intulit; scilicet, iure licito et iure honoris quem sustinet"). Cf. 
Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 21 sqq. 
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be provided. Neither would there be relief if a person brought force to bear on 
a debtor in order to obtain payment.29 Fear was also not understood simply to 
mean any apprehension whatever, but rather "fear of some evil of exceptional 
severity" (maioris malitatis).30 It should further not have been the fear felt by a 
weak-minded man, but rather that fear which might reasonably have an effect 
upon a man of the most resolute character ("homo constantissimus").31 It did 
not cover metus reverentialis, which is the fear or profound reverence which a 
son, for example, could feel for his father, and which would induce the son to 
act in a certain way.32 Many examples are mentioned of the application of this 
edict: these deal with fear of personal harm, such as death,33 harm to physical 
integrity and loss of freedom,34 and possibily also fear of harm of an economic 
nature.35 Threats of harm to family are also covered.36 
 
29 This did not exclude relief by other means. In certain cases of self-help the lex Julia 
de vi privata could impose criminal liability (cf. Mod. D. 48.7.8; Kaser, Das römische 
Privatrecht I, p. 222; Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 43 sq. 158 sqq.). 
Furthermore, through the decretum divi Marci a creditor who engaged in self-help could also 
be punished by the loss of his claim (Call. D. 4.2.13; cf. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, p. 
222, and on the post-classical law, Das römische Privatrecht II, p. 41). 
30 Ulp. D. 4.2.5; also see Ulp. D. 4.2.23.3. 
31 Gai. D. 4.2.6 ("Metum autem non vani hominis, sed qui merito et in homine 
constantissimo cadat"). Cf. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 27 sqq.; 
Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 653 sq. 
32 Cf. Cels. D. 23.2.22; Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, p. 18, n. 1; 
Von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts, vol. 3, p. 102 note c). 
33 Cf. Ulp. D. 4.2.3.1; Ulp. D. 4.2.7; Paul. D. 4.2.8; Ulp. D. 4.6.3. 
34 Cf. e.g. Paul. D. 4.2.2 (fear of an attack which cannot be repelled); Paul. D. 4.2.8.2 
(fear of sexual assault); Paul. D. 4.2.4 and Paul. 4.2.8.1 (fear of slavery); Ulp. D. 4.2.7; Paul. 
D. 4.2.22 (fear of imprisonment); Ulp. D. 4.2.7.1; Ulp. D. 4.2.23.1 (fear of being brought in 
chains); Ulp. D. 4.2.23.2 (an athelete's fear of being confined, thus preventing him from 
entering into contests). 
35 Cf. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 40 sq. But cf. also C.4.13; 
Dawson, "Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German law", 1937 (3) 
Tulane Law Review 35, 347. 
36 Cf. Paul. D. 4.2.8.3; Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, p. 42. 
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Thus far the focus was on the relationship between vis and metus, and the 
meaning of metus. The question now arises as to what exactly was meant by 
the expression "quod metus causa gestum erit". Various possibilities exist.37 
Georg H. Maier argues that it means "what has been done with the purpose of 
causing fear". The conduct instilling fear would therefore be the object of the 
edict.38 This interpretation draws its strength from the view that metus is a 
delict: the focus is on the wrongfulness of the conduct, and not on the 
emotional state of the victim. However, as Kunkel indicates, this interpretation 
does not fit in well with the words "ratum non habebo", which could surely 
only pertain to the act of the victim and not to the act of the wrongdoer.39 The 
conventional approach is then that the Edict applies to the act which the victim 
concluded out of fear ("metus causa").40 However, this approach only really 
explains why the victim has a claim against the wrongdoer; its fails to explain 
why third party recipients could also be liable under the edict. Kupisch's 
alternative approach overcomes this problem by interpreting "metus causa" as 
"as a consequence of fear", rather than the conventional "out of fear".41 Thus, 
if a third party who had nothing to do with the extortion receives something as 
a consequence thereof, he could still fall under the Edict.42 In this way, the 
focus of the Edict is constantly on the restitution of what has been obtained, 
and has to be returned, rather than on the punishment of wrongs.43  
 
37 For a general overview, see Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 654. 
38 Maier, Prätorische Bereicherungsklagen, pp. 96 sqq. 
39 Kunkel, Römisches Privatrecht, p. 261, n. 5; Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen 
Privatrecht, p. 55, n. 16; Kaser, "Zur in integrum restitutio, besonders wegen metus und 
dolus", (1977) 94 ZSS (RA), 123. 
40 Cf. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, p. 55; Zimmermann, The Law 
of Obligations, p. 654. 
41 Kupisch, In integrum restitutio und vindicatio utilis bei Eigentumsübertragungen im 
klassischen römischen Recht, pp. 146 sq. 
42 Cf. Kaser, "Zur in integrum restitutio, besonders wegen metus und dolus", (1977) 94 
ZSS (RA), 123 ("Der Prätor will jeglichen im Gefolge einer Furchterregung gemachten 
Erwerb entkräften oder wieder rückgängig machen"); Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, 
p. 654. 
43 Cf. Kupisch, In integrum restitutio und vindicatio utilis bei Eigentumsübertragungen 
im klassischen römischen Recht, p. 148. 
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It is against this background that the remedies the Edict gave rise to - the 
consequences of "ratum non habebo" - can be examined. Again, academic 
opinion is divided.44 Conventional thought,45 based on the work of Schulz,46 
maintains that classical Roman law provided three separate remedies in cases 
of metus, namely the exceptio metus, in integrum restitutio (propter metum), 
and the actio quod metus causa. These remedies will now be dealt with in 
turn. 
i.  The exceptio metus 
It has already been shown that the exceptio metus was inherent in bonae fidei 
iudicia. The judge could therefore simply refuse to enforce such agreements if 
they were concluded under metus. For plaintiffs not fortunate enough to obtain 
the relief on this basis, the praetor also provided an exceptio metus.47 The 
remedy was generally available against the wrongdoer as well as third 
parties.48 Incidentally, it will be indicated below how a condictio could 
possibly be provided if a transfer was made by a victim who was not aware 
that he had this exceptio at his disposal.49 
 
44 On the difficulties surrounding the interpretation of the text in general, cf. Ankum, 
"Eine neue Interpretation von Ulpian Dig. 4.2.9.5-6 über die Abhilfen gegen metus", in: 
Festschrift für Heinz Hübner, p. 3. 
45 Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 189 sqq.; Jolowicz, Historical 
Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, p. 292; Lee, The Elements of Roman Law with a 
Translation of the Institutes of Justinian, p. 352; Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law, pp. 373 
sqq.; Buckland, A Text-book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, pp. 593 sqq.; 
Honsell (et al.), Römisches Recht, pp. 126, n. 72, 375, n. 12; Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht 
I, pp. 244 sqq. 
46 See his Classical Roman Law, p. 600 sqq. and "Die Lehre vom erzwungenen 
Rechtsgeschäft im antiken römischen Recht", (1922) 43 ZSS (RA) 171 sqq. 
47 Cf. Ulp. D. 44.4.4.33. Its exact relationship with the actio quod metus causa is not 
clear (see Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 658). 
48 Ulp. D. 44.4.4.33. Cf. Schulz, Classical Roman Law, p. 603. 
49 Cf. text to notes 99 and 100. 
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ii.  In integrum restitutio 
It has been indicated above that the civil law at times was unable to provide 
satisfactory relief in cases of metus. To overcome this problem, the Edict 
empowered the praetor to provide in integrum restitutio (propter metum).50 
The remedy entailed that the praetor ensured a return to the former legal state 
by way of the annulment of an existing legal state. The victim was therefore 
entitled to be placed in the position he would have been if there was no 
compulsion.51 The exact scope of the relief varied in accordance with the facts 
of each case, e.g. whether a right of action was lost, an obligation was 
undertaken, or an object was transferred.52 
iii  The actio quod metus causa 
According to conventional thought, in addition to in integrum restitutio, the 
Edict also provided the separate remedy of the actio quod metus causa.53 If 
instituted within one year after something was obtained through metus, the 
actio quod metus causa could be used to claim four times the damages54 
suffered as a result of the metus. If instituted after one year, only simple 
damages could be claimed. However, since it was an actio arbitraria, the 
defender was allowed to escape this fourfold liability by returning that which 
 
50 Cf. the general wording of Ulp. D. 4.2.1; Schulz, Classical Roman Law, p. 603; 
Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, p. 244, n. 20; Das römische Zivilprozessrecht, pp.   
330 sqq.; Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 656. The remedy has been described as 
"the most striking exercise of his imperium by the praetor" (Thomas, Textbook of Roman 
Law, p. 113). 
51 Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, p. 244; Kupisch, In integrum restitutio und 
vindicatio utilis bei Eigentumsübertragungen im klassischen römischen Recht, pp. 3 sqq.; 
Kunkel, Römisches Privatrecht, p. 381. 
52 Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law, p. 113. 
53 Cf. generally Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 656, and especially n. 43 and 
authorities quoted there. 
54 Cf. Ulp. D. 4.2.14.1; Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, p. 244. The claim for 
damages did not only include the value of that which was obtained, but also its fruits (cf. 
Ulp. D. 4.2.12; Ulp. D. 4.2.14.7, Paul. D. 4.2.21.2), lost profits (cf. Thomas, Textbook of 
Roman Law, p. 374; Ulp. D. 4.2.12) and accidental loss (Ulp. D. 4.2.12, Ulp. D. 4.2.14.11; C. 
2.19.1; Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 221, 227). 
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was obtained through metus.55 If the pursuer himself obtained something 
under the transaction, he could not retain it as a windfall, but had to give it 
back too.56 
Because the actio quod metus causa awarded damages in quadruplum, 
many regard it as mainly a penal action for damages. However, the action was 
also in rem scripta, i.e. not only available against the wrongdoer, but against 
anyone (also bona fide third parties) who acquired something as the 
consequence of metus.57 It is rather unusual for a penal action to allow a 
defender to escape liability for damages by returning that which was obtained 
through metus. This characteristic is treated as important by those who reject 
the conventional approach, and believe that in classical law the actio quod 
metus causa was not a remedy separate from in integrum restitutio, but an 
instrument aimed at achieving in integrum restitutio.58 The argument is that 
the purpose of fourfold damages was to provide an incentive for the person 
who had the goods to return them. Only if he persisted in refusing to give the 
 
55 Cf. Ulp. D. 4.2.14.1; Kaser, Das römische Zivilprozessrecht, p. 257, n. 9. 
56 Cf. Kaser, "Zur in integrum restitutio, besonders wegen metus und dolus", (1977) 94 
ZSS (RA), 135 sqq.; cf. also Kaser, Das römische Zivilprozessrecht, p. 330; Hartkamp, Der 
Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 232 sqq. 
57 Cf. Maier, Prätorische Bereicherungsklagen, pp. 110 sqq.; Hartkamp, Der Zwang im 
römischen Privatrecht, pp. 201 sqq. (esp. p. 203 nn. 13, 14); Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht 
II, p. 90, n. 46, Das römische Privatrecht I, p. 244, n. 25; contra Beseler, Beiträge zur Kritik 
der römischen Rechtsquellen, vol. I, p. 74; Von Lübtow, Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa 
gestum erit", pp. 183 sqq.; Schulz, Classical Roman Law, p. 601. A mala fide third party was 
equated with the wrongdoer (Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, p. 201, n. 1). A 
bona fide third party was sometimes treated differently (cf. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im 
römischen Privatrecht, pp. 190 sq., 219 sqq.). He was only liable for loss after litis contestatio 
which could be ascribed to dolus on his side (cf. Ulp. D.4.2.14.5, Maier, Prätorische 
Bereicherungsklagen, pp. 134 sqq.; Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 222 
sqq., 242). Hartkamp discusses the possibility that sometimes cautiones had to be given that 
the third party would return the goods if he found it again (cf. Ulp. D. 4.2.14.11). It is no clear 
whether a bona fide third party who purchased something which was obtained as a 
consequence of fear could refuse restitution unless his purchase price was repaid (cf. Maier, 
Prätorische Bereicherungsklagen, pp. 145 sqq.; Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen 
Privatrecht, pp. 231 sqq., 243). 
58 Cf. generally Kupisch, In integrum restitutio und vindicatio utilis bei 
Eigentumsübertragungen im klassischen römischen Recht, pp. 123 passim; Kaser, "Zur in 
integrum restitutio, besonders wegen metus und dolus", (1977) 94 ZSS (RA), 101, 108 
passim. 
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goods back, should he be punished.59 Such an analysis certainly fits in well 
with the nature of the actio quod metus causa as an actio arbitraria. The rule 
that the judge could only condemn for a sum of money did not function 
properly when the victim wanted what he was entitled to as a matter of right 
and not (merely) a sum of money. The actio arbitraria then provided the judge 
a way around this problem by allowing him to determine that a monetary 
amount would be payable if the defendant did not act in a certain way. In the 
context of metus, the actio quod metus causa could then be used to effect 
restitution. This approach also draws much of its persuasive power from the 
argument that if the actio quod metus causa was purely a penal remedy, it is 
highly questionable why a third party who merely received the goods obtained 
through metus, and not the wrongdoer, would be exposed to the actio. It 
further solves the problem which the conventional approach has in explaining 
the odd overlapping relationship between the actio quod metus causa and in 
integrum restitutio.60 
In post-classical law the distinction between the ius civile and ius 
honorarium was removed, and because the roles of the judge, who granted 
civilian relief, and the praetor, who granted relief according to the ius 
honorarium, were merged, a single remedy could be granted for all cases of 
metus. Whether it was due to a Justinianic integration ("Verschmelzung"),61 or 
purely a continuation of the classical position does not matter: post-classical 
 
59 Cf. Zimmermann, "The Law of Obligations, pp. 656 sq.; Visser, "Rethinking 
Unjustified Enrichment: A Perspective of the Competition between Contractual and 
Enrichment Remedies", 1992 Acta Juridica 203, 220. 
60 Cf. Kaser, "Zur in integrum restitutio, besonders wegen metus und dolus", (1977) 94 
ZSS (RA), 104 sqq., 109 sqq. (esp. 116); Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 656 sq.; 
but cf. Ankum, "Eine neue Interpretation von Ulpian Dig. 4.2.9.5-6 über die Abhilfen gegen 
metus", in: Festschrift für Heinz Hübner, p. 4, n. 5 and Gunter Wesener's review of Kupisch's 
In integrum restitutio und vindicatio utilis bei Eigentumsübertragungen im klassischen 
römischen Recht in (1976) 44 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 169. 
61 Cf. Schulz, "Die Lehre vom erzwungenen Rechtsgeschäft im antiken römischen 
Recht, 1922 (43) ZSS (RA), 171, 229 sqq.; Von Lübtow, Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa 
gestum erit", p. 218; Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 201 sq. It is not 
clear where exactly in Ulp. D.4.2.9 the discussion of in integrum restitutio is supposed to stop, 
and that of the actio quod metus causa is supposed to start. Traditionally it has been placed 
between Ulp. D.4.2.9.6 and 7 (cf. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 190 
sqq.), but according to Ankum it should be placed between Ulp. D.4.2.9.4 and 5 ("Eine neue 
Interpretation von Ulpian Dig. 4.2.9.5-6 über die Abhilfen gegen metus", in: Festschrift für 
Heinz Hübner, p. 3). 
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law did not treat the actio quod metus causa and in integrum restitutio as 
distinct remedies.62 A person who was compelled to enter into a transaction 
could claim back that which the recipient obtained,63 as well as threefold 
damages if restitution did not take place.64 The actio was in rem scripta,65 and, 
as in classical law, the exceptio metus was available to ward off claims based 
on transactions where metus was present.66 
iv.  Excursus: Voidness or voidability? 
At this stage is appropriate to pause and briefly consider the effect of the 
praetorian law on the validity of transactions concluded under compulsion. At 
least two options present themselves, namely voidness or voidability (i.e. 
validity until such time as the victim obtained relief). The question as to which 
of these alternatives is preferable, is difficult to answer, for Roman law did not 
draw an explicit distinction between voidness and voidability.67 In these times 
 
62 Cf. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht II, p. 90, n. 47; Levy, "Zur nachklassischen in 
integrum restitutio", 1951 (68) ZSS (RA) 398 sqq. (esp. 405); Hartkamp, Der Zwang im 
römischen Privatrecht, pp. 173 sqq. In integrum restitutio, in its propter metum form, actually 
seems to have disappeared during the time of Constantine. On the process of amalgamation 
which characterised the post-classical law in general, see Schulz, Classical Roman law, pp. 
457 sq. Another feature was the grouping together of certain delicts, such as furtum, rapina, 
damnum iniuria datum and iniuria. However, metus, like dolus, was not included in the list, 
although it subsequently came to be termed a "praetorian delict" (see Nicholas, An 
Introduction to Roman law, pp. 210 sq.; Thomas, Textbook of Roman law, pp. 373 sq.). 
63 He could also rely on the agreement: cf. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen 
Privatrecht, pp. 50 sq., referring to C. 2.19.4 (Gord. 239) and C. 2.19.2 (Alex. 226).  
64 Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht II, p. 90; Das römische Zivilprozessrecht, p. 471. 
Cf. Ulp. D. 4.2.14.10. Also cf. Ulp. D. 4.2.9.6; Ulp. D. 4.2.14.1; Ulp. D. 4.2.14.3; Ulp. D. 
4.2.14.7. On restitutio, cf. in general Ulp. D. 4.2.3; Paul. D. 4.2.8; Ulp. D. 4.2.9.7; and Ulp. D. 
4.2.12 (regarding the measure of restitution). 
65 Schulz, Classical Roman Law, pp. 604 sq.; cf. Ulp. D. 4.2.9.3 and Ulp. 4.2.9.8. 
66 Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht II, p. 90; cf. Ulp. D. 4.2.9.3. 
67 Cf. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 246 sqq.; Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht 
II, p. 90, n. 48 and Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 678 sqq., but cf. Schulz, 
Classical Roman Law, p. 602. Paulus regarded compelled transactions are valid in principle 
(D. 4.2.21.5) whereas Ulpian stated that "nothing is so contrary to consent ... as force or fear" 
(D. 50.17.116: "Nihil consensui tam contrarium est, qui ac bonae fidei iudicia sustinet, quam 
vis atque metus: quem comprobare contra bonos mores est"). This again indicates that 
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it was practically unimportant whether one regarded such agreements as void 
or voidable. The distinction (like that between vis absoluta and vis 
compulsiva) is of post-Roman origin. It seems unwise to attempt to force such 
structuring concepts onto Roman law.68 The important point is that the victim 
of compulsion could attack the transaction and claim restitution.69 
3.  COMPULSION AND THE CONDICTIONES 
Thus far the focus has been almost exclusively on the praetorian remedies of 
the actio quod metus causa, in integrum restitutio and the exceptio metus. 
However, it was not only the law relating to metus which could provide relief 
to victims of compulsion: mention has already been made of legislative reform 
through the leges repetundarum,70 the lex Julia de vi privata, the decretum divi 
Marci71 and the Edict of Lucellus against robbery (the actio vi bonorum 
raptorum),72 as well as the relief the ius civile provided where negotia bonae 
fidei were concerned.73 The attention will now turn to the condictio74 - a 
 
compelled transactions were void. In the age between classical and Justinianic law compelled 
transactions were generally regarded as void (Levy, "Zur nachklassischen in integrum 
restitutio", 1951 (68) ZSS (RA), 360, 398 sqq., esp. 404 sqq.). Cf. Paul. Sent. 1.7.10; CT 
15.14.8, according to which one of the exceptions to a list of valid transactions concluded 
between tyranni are those dolo metuve caruerunt, but again there is support for the contrary 
position (cf. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, p. 173, n. 3, Levy, "Zur 
nachklassischen in integrum restitutio", 1951 (68) ZSS (RA), 408 n. 195). 
68 Von Lübtow, Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa gestum erit", p. 73; Kaser, "Zur in 
integrum restitutio, besonders wegen metus und dolus", (1977) 94 ZSS (RA), 107 sq. 
69 Cf. Levy, "Zur nachklassischen in integrum restitutio", 1951 (68) ZSS (RA), 360, 408. 
70 Cf. n. 10 supra. 
71 Cf. n. 29 supra. 
72 Cf. text to n. 10 supra. 
73 Cf. text to n. 4 supra. 
74 On the condictiones, see Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 592 sqq.; Kaser, Das 
römische Privatrecht II, pp. 421 sqq.; Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 834 sqq.; 
Liebs, "The History of the Roman Condictio up to Justinian" in: Essays for Tony Honoré, 
p. 163, esp. nn. 1, 2 and authorities quoted there; J. von Koschembahr-Lyskowski, Die 
Condictio als Bereicherungsklage im klassischen römischen Recht I (Weimar, 1903), II 
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remarkable stricti iuris action which, like the praetorian remedies, could be 
used to obtain restitution in cases of compulsion. 
3.1  Classical law 
In early classical procedure a legis actio per condictionem could be used to 
recover a specific object (certa res) or sum of money (certa pecunia): in 
essence, this process entailed that the victim could give notice (condicere) 
before a magistrate that a matter would be referred for trial before a judge.75 
The defendant could avert this process by settlement or by submitting to the 
claim. The appeal of this procedure throughout its various stages of 
development lay in its abstract nature: without stating the basis for recovery or 
causa debendi, the pursuer could use the condictio to obtain recovery of a 
certum in a variety of circumstances.76 It is therefore not suprising that the 
condictio came to be applied in certain non-contractual cases of what 
nowadays would be termed unjustified enrichment.77 In classical law the basis 
of relief by way of the condictio in such cases  was  the  absence  of  a  causa  
retinendi,  i.e.  the fact that a person held something of another without being 
entitled thereto.78 It is then said that in such cases two requirements had to be 
 
(Weimar, 1907); Robert von Mayr, Die Condictio des römischen Privatrechtes (Leipzig, 
1900); Von Lübtow, Beiträge zur Lehre von der Condictio nach römischem und geltendem 
Recht; Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassichen römischen Recht; Schulz, 
Classical Roman Law, 610 sqq.; Honoré, "Condictio and payment", 1958 Acta Juridica 135; 
Peiris, Some Aspects of the Law of Unjust Enrichment in South Africa and Ceylon, pp. 70 sqq., 
130 sqq.; Visser, Die rol van dwaling by die condictio indebiti, pp. 1 sqq.; De Vos, 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. 
75 Cf. G.4.18; Liebs, "The History of the Roman Condictio up to Justinian" in: Essays 
for Tony Honoré, p. 164; Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 835. 
76 G.4.176. However, as Liebs points out, since sponsio or stipulatio were in any event 
the only ground for making the claim (in early law), "that peculiarity seems not to have been 
very remarkable originally" ("The History of the Roman Condictio up to Justinian", in: Essays 
for Tony Honoré, p. 165 n. 9). 
77 See Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 836 sqq. 
78 Cf. Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassichen römischen Recht, pp. 212 
sqq.; Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, p. 595; Visser, Die rol van dwaling by die condictio 
indebiti, p. 3, n. 9. 
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met for a successful claim with the condictio.79 Firstly, with a few notable 
exceptions,80 there had to be some act of conferment - a transfer or datio 
whereby ownership was acquired.81 In this regard it has been argued that the 
datio had to be supported by its own causa dandi,82 which in this context 
indicates with what purpose the datio was made, e.g. to pay a debt.83 Secondly, 
 
79 Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 592 sqq. 
80 For a discussion of the exceptions, most notably theft (the condictio furtiva) and 
similar situations which involved taking, such as driving an owner off his land (a condictio `ex 
iniusta causa'), see Liebs, "The History of the Roman Condictio up to Justinian", in: Essays 
for Tony Honoré, pp. 169 sqq. 
81 Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 594; Von Lübtow, Beiträge zur Lehre von der 
Condictio nach römischem und geltendem Recht, p. 146; Evans-Jones, "From `undue transfer' 
to `retention without a legal basis'", in: Evans-Jones ed., The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland, 
p. 219; Honoré, "Condictio and payment", 1958 Acta Juridica, 135. It is not clear whether a 
valid datio required a negotium between the parties. In Jul. D. 12.6.33 it is stated that "If I 
build on your site and you possess the house, there is no room for a condictio because there 
has been no dealing (nullum negotium) between us. For one who pays what is not owed does 
go through a kind of transaction (aliquid negotii) by the act of paying. But when an owner 
takes possession on his own of a building, placed there by another, he enters no transaction." 
According to Kaser this indicates that the datio required a negotium contractum gestum, i.e. an 
acceptable form of cooperation between the parties aimed at reaching a particular legal 
outcome (cf. Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 594). According to Schwarz the negotium 
requirement would not be met where there was a delict (Die Grundlage der Condictio im 
klassichen römischen Recht, pp. 11 sq.) For criticism of the negotium requirement, see Liebs, 
"The History of the Roman Condictio up to Justinian", in: Essays for Tony Honoré, p. 172, 
esp. n. 63, where it is indicated that a condictio could arise from consumption, accessio, 
commixtio or confusio (also cf. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 854). On the demise 
of the negotium requirement in Roman Dutch law cf. De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, pp. 75 sqq. This was only in regard to the condictio sine causa 
specialis (i.e. not in regard to the condictiones indebiti, ob turpem vel iniustam causam and 
causa data causa non secuta, which are dealt with below). 
82 Cf. Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassichen römischen Recht, pp. 191 
sqq., 219 sqq.; Visser, Die rol van dwaling by die condictio indebiti, pp. 6 sq., 11 sq. On the 
requirement of a iusta causa traditionis in the specific case of a datio in the form of traditio, 
see text to n. 132 infra. 
83 Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassichen römischen Recht, pp. 229 sq.; 
cf. Visser, Die rol van dwaling by die condictio indebiti, p. 11; Visser, "Die Grondslag van die 
condictio indebiti", 1988 (51) THRHR 491, 495. 
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the purpose for which the datio was made  had to fail.84 This failure of the 
purpose meant that what had been received was retained sine causa, and that 
the condictio was available to recover it. The following are examples of such a 
failure of  purpose: 
(a)  Where a person erroneously85 made a datio with the purpose of 
paying a debt (solvendi causa), while the debt was in fact not due 
(indebitum).86 It seems as if classical law the error requirement 
essentially entailed that the claimant should prove that he made an 
undue transfer, which would then give rise to a presumption that it was 
made in error. The defendant could rebut this presumption by proving 
that the transfer was made in the knowledge that it was not due.87 
(b)  Due to the fragmented and restricted nature of the Roman law of 
contracts,88 a datio could also be made in the absence of a valid 
 
84 Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassichen römischen Recht, pp. 212 sqq. 
Cf. also Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 595 sq. He seems to differ from Schwarz by 
referring to the purpose of the transferor, rather than the agreed upon purpose of the parties. 
For a more careful approach, cf. Visser, Die rol van dwaling by die condictio indebiti, pp. 16 
sq. According to him it seems "possible to conclude" that the basis of the condictio in classical 
law was retention of a performance without legal ground. He also states that there is the 
"strong possibility" that the law regarded cases where the agreed purpose of the performance 
failed, as cases of unjustified retention. 
85 On the error requirement in classical law cf., generally, Kaser, Das römische 
Privatrecht I, p. 596, n. 36 and authorities quoted there; Zimmermann, The Law of 
Obligations, pp. 849 sqq.; Visser, Die rol van dwaling by die condictio indebiti, pp. 22 sqq. 
86 Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, p. 596. 
87 Cf. Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassichen römischen Recht, pp. 96 
sqq., pp. 294 sqq.; Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 850. The extreme views of 
Beseler and Solazzi, i.e. that the state of mind of the transferor did not matter at all, and that 
he could claim with a condictio even if he knew no debt was due, seem totally at variance with 
the texts (cf. G.3.91, Ulp. D. 12.6.1.1, Paul. D. 50.17.53; cf. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht 
I, p. 596, n. 36; Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 849, n. 102; Visser, Die rol van 
dwaling by die condictio indebiti, pp. 26 sq.). As to the implication of knowledge on the side 
of the recipient that the transfer is not due, see Visser, Die rol van dwaling by die condictio 
indebiti, p. 22; Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassischen römischen Recht p. 297. 
The possibility cannot be discounted that the wrongdoer could be exposed to a condictio 
furtiva, since receipt of a transfer in the knowledge that it is not due can amount to furtum. 
88 Cf. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 843. 
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contract, but in the expectation that the recipient would do something 
(a datio ob rem). If the expected outcome did not ensue, the purpose 
likewise failed. An exception to the latter case is where the expected 
outcome did ensue, but the acceptance of the datio was morally 
offensive (a datio ob turpem rem or ob turpem causam),89 or illegal (a 
datio ob injustam causam).90 Recovery was then possible, unless the 
transferor was also tainted by turpitude.91 
The meaning of the transfer ob turpem rem or ob turpem causam needs to 
be examined more closely. In essence, it involved cases where the recipient 
could be condemned with infamia,92 where he acted contrary to certain 
imperial legislation protecting the boni mores, and where he violated rules of 
practice regarding the integrity of family life.93 One of the examples of 
compulsion which lead to infamia is where a person who holds goods in 
deposit for another demands money for its return. This was quite contrary to 
his duty of trust.94 
 
89 Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 597 sq.; cf. Schwarz, Die Grundlage der 
Condictio im klassischen römischen Recht, pp.   169 sqq. 
90 The few texts which deal with the condictio where it fulfills this function are Gai. D. 
24.1.6 (transfers contrary to the prohibition of donations between spouses), Ulp. D. 12.7.1.3 
and Ulp. D. 12.5.6 (broader but vague, with controversial roots in the condictio furtiva). Cf. 
Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassichen römischen Recht, pp. 274 sqq.; Kaser, 
Das römische Privatrecht I, p. 598, n. 49. 
91 Cf. text to nn. 119 – 121 infra. 
92 Cf. Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassischen römischen Recht p. 169 
sqq., 172 sqq.; Kaser, "Rechtswidrigkeit und Sittenwidrigkeit im klassichen römischen 
Recht", 60 (1940) ZSS (RA), 95, 112 sqq.). 
93 On the meaning of dare ob rem turpem, cf. Kaser, "Rechtswidrigkeit und 
Sittenwidrigkeit im klassichen römischen Recht", 60 (1940) ZSS (RA) 95; Schwarz, Die 
Grundlage der Condictio im klassischen römischen Recht p. 169 sqq. 
94 Cf. Paul. D. 12.5.2.1; Kaser, "Rechtswidrigkeit und Sittenwidrigkeit im klassichen 
römischen Recht", 60 (1940) ZSS (RA), 95, 116. Other examples are sacrilegium facere (Ulp. 
D. 12.5.2pr), furtum (Ulp. D. 12.5.2pr, Ulp. D. 12.5.4.1), homicidium (Ulp. D. 12.5.2pr), 
iudicem corrumpere (Ulp. D. 12.5.2.2), iniuria (Ulp. D. 12.5.4.2), calumnia (Paul. D. 12.6.65, 
Ulp. D. 3.6.5.1), stuprum (Ulp. D. 12.5.4pr), concussio (C. 4.7.3), meretricium (Ulp. D. 
12.5.4.3) and incestum (Pap. D. 12.7.5pr). Cf. Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im 
klassischen römischen Recht, p. 169 sqq., 172 sqq.; Kaser, "Rechtswidrigkeit und 
Sittenwidrigkeit im klassichen römischen Recht", 60 (1940) ZSS (RA), 95, 112 sqq.). 
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3.2  Post-Classical law 
In post-classical law, the "single" condictio disappeared, and was replaced by 
specific condictiones, each with their own field of application. However, in 
contrast to the classical condictio, these condictiones did have a unity of 
purpose, in that they were more clearly linked to the notion of natural justice, 
equity or good faith that no person should enrich himself at the expense of 
another.95 In fact, there are indications that all the condictiones could be 
grouped together under a "general" condictio sine causa.96 Again, as in 
classical law, the measure of recovery was determined by what had been 
obtained without legal ground, and not merely by the amount of enrichment 
remaining at the commencement of legal proceedings.97 Two of these specific 
condictiones, namely the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam and the 
condictio indebiti are of some relevance to cases of compulsion and need to be 
examined more closely. 
i.  The condictio indebiti 
It will be recalled that in classical times the condictio could be used to recover 
a datio which was made with the purpose of paying a debt (solvendi causa), 
which was in fact not due (an indebitum). Some uncertainty exists as to 
whether the condictio, when fulfilling this function, could be used in classical 
law to recover a transfer made on the grounds of an extorted stipulation. There 
are a number of considerations which indicate that that this may not have been 
the case. Firstly, the victim would have to prove that the transfer was undue, 
 
95 Cf. Pomp. D. 12.6.14: "For it is by nature fair (natura aequum est) that nobody 
should enrich himself at the expense of another". Also cf. Pomp. D. 50.17.206; Von Lübtow, 
Beiträge zur Lehre von der Condictio nach römischem und geltendem Recht, p. 21; Kaser, 
Das römische Privatrecht II, pp. 421 sq. 
96 On the condictio sine causa generalis, see Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 
856 sq. According to Schwarz, " ... die causa sei für die Byzantiner dasjenige, was die 
Leistung oder das Versprechen objektiv, innerlich rechtfertigt, sein Fehlen ruft die condictio 
auf den Plan; und zwar meinten sie: Entweder ist es gar nicht da, von Anfang an, oder es fällt 
später fort, oder man erwartet es, aber es trifft nicht ein. Das ergibt sich als byzantinische 
Lehre aus D. 12,7,1,2 und eod. 4. Klarer kann man den Gedanken nicht wiedergeben; denn er 
ist nicht klar gedacht" (Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassichen römischen Recht, pp. 209 
sqq.). On the relationship between this notion and the concept of retinere sine causa in 
classical law, cf. Visser, Die rol van dwaling by die condictio indebiti, pp. 17 sqq. 
97 Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht II, p. 425. 
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but according to civil law he had a problem: what was willed under 
compulsion was nonetheless willed (voluntas coacta tamen voluntas est). As 
Schwarz states: "he who peforms ex stipulatione, performs something which is 
due under civil law".98 It is only under praetorian law, which recognised the 
remedies on grounds of metus, that one could talk of an indebitum. Secondly, 
it would have to be assumed that the victim made the transfer with the purpose 
of paying a debt (solvendi causa). This assumption does not hold if the 
purpose is viewed subjectively: the victim's intention is rather that the 
compulsion should come to an end. It is only by using a broad, objective 
interpretation that one could argue that the purpose of the transfer is to 
discharge a debt. And thirdly, on the assumption that the debt could be 
regarded as undue under praetorian law, it would still have to be proved that 
payment was not made in the knowledge (scientia) that it was undue 
(indebitum).99 The prima facie conclusion is therefore that recovery with the 
condictio would not be possible. However, the position might not have been 
that simple. It has been suggested that the victim might have found a way to 
circumvent this problem.100 The possibility exists that the victim could have 
been ignorant of the fact that he could defend himself with the praetorian 
remedy of an exceptio metus causa. If the victim did not know the defence 
was available, it cannot be said that he knowingly transferred an indebitum. 
Consequently, the victim of an extorted stipulation might have been able to 
claim with the condictio in classical law.101 
In the more fragmented post-classical law the recovery of an indebitum 
became the domain of a specific condictio, namely the condictio indebiti. 
However, it is clear that in post-classical law this condictio was not used to 
provide relief where a transfer was made on grounds of an extorted agreement. 
It was not only the fact that Justinian made error102 a "positive" requirement 
 
98 Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassischen römischen Recht, p. 297. 
99 Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassischen römischen Recht, pp. 294 sqq. 
100 Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassischen römischen Recht, pp. 294 sqq. 
101 Cf. Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassischen römischen Recht, pp. 297 
sq. 
102 Error should not be construed too narrowly, since payments made in doubt whether a 
debt was due could still be recovered. Cf. Liebs, "The History of the Roman Condictio up to 
Justinian", in: Essays for Tony Honoré, p. 178. 
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for claiming with the condictio indebiti which militated against such a 
development.103 To Justinian the receipt of such transfers were tainted with 
turpitude. It will now be indicated how he made his new condictio ob turpem 
vel iniustam causam available for the recovery of such transfers. 
ii  The condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam 
Whereas classical law provided the condictio if, amongst others, a transfer was 
made ob turpem or iniustam causam, the Digest accommodates these cases in 
a single title dealing with the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam.104 
Transfers ob turpem rem (or causam) have been discussed above and what has 
been said there need not be repeated here. Transfers ob iniustam causam are 
dealt with briefly in D. 12.5.6,105 which states that: 
"Perpetuo Sabinus probavit veterum opinionem existimantium id, quod 
ex iniusta causa apud aliquem sit, posse condici: in qua sententia 
etiam Celsus est" ("Sabinus always said that the early jurists were right 
in holding that the condictio would go for anything in someone's hands 
on an unlawful basis. Celsus shares that view"). 
Apparently, the condictio ob iniustam causam was included in the title due to 
Theodosian reform, whereby the (mere) infringement of a statutory prohibition 
gave rise to invalidity. This stands in contrast to classical law, which only 
regarded serious breaches of statutory prohibition as tainted by turpitude, and, 
hence, granted the condictio ob turpem causam.106 
 
103 Cf. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 850 sq.; Evans-Jones, "From `undue 
transfer' to `retention without a legal basis'", in: Evans-Jones, ed., The Civil Law Tradition in 
Scotland, pp. 220 sqq. Justinian further qualified the type of error which would be acceptable 
for claiming with this condictio. In general errors of law excluded recovery, and errors of fact 
did not. Cf. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 850 sq. On the classical roots, see 
Visser, Die rol van dwaling by die condictio indebiti, pp. 31 sqq. 
104 D 12.5. Where the transfer was made for an honest purpose (ob honestam causam), 
no recovery was possible (cf. Paul. D. 12.5.1.1, Ulp. D. 12.5.4). Whether it in fact comprised 
two separate condictiones or one is not clear. Cf. generally Glück, Pandecten, vol. 12 ad D. 
12.5, pp. 50 sqq.; De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, pp. 20 sqq. 
105 But also cf. Ulp. D. 12.7.1.3. 
106 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 846, n. 77; Liebs, "The History of the 
Roman Condictio up to Justinian", in: Essays for Tony Honoré, pp. 175 sq. 
23 J.E. du Plessis University of Aberdeen 
 
 
Digest title 12.5 lists various examples where the condictio ob turpem vel 
iniustam causam applied. A number of these deal with compulsion. Firstly, as 
has been alluded to above, this condictio applied in the case of the (by now 
degenerate)107 stipulatio extorted by vis.108 Pomp. D.12.5.7 reads as follows: 
"Ex ea stipulatione, quae per vim extorta esset, si exacta esset pecunia, 
repetitionem esse constat" ("It is agreed that money exacted under a 
stipulation itself extorted by force is recoverable"). 
Although this text seems acceptable if one purely focuses on the turpitudinous 
conduct of the wrongdoer in accepting the payment, it is in fact problematical. 
After all, the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam was a subcategory or 
modality of the condictio causa data causa non secuta. It was used to recover 
a transfer aimed at obtaining a counterperformance (a datio ob rem) where the 
acceptance of the performance was tainted with turpitude.109 It did not apply to 
a transfer aimed at fulfilling a debt (a datio solvendi causa). Insofar as the 
victim's payment on ground of the compelled stipulation is aimed at fulfilling 
a debt, it is not a datio ob rem, but a datio solvendi causa. The implication is 
then that the condictio indebiti would be a more appropriate remedy. 
However, as indicated above, the condictio indebiti was now subject to the 
error requirement, which excludes this possibility. 
The second category of examples contained in D. 12.5 deal with the 
situation where someone receives a transfer to do what he is obliged to do in 
any event. These cases are not expressly link to the notion of vis (or metus) 
like D.12.5.7, but still clearly deal with compulsion: each case involves an 
implicit wrongful threat. The texts are the following. Paul D.12.5.2.1 deals 
with the situation  
"Si tibi dedero, ut rem mihi reddas depositam apud te vel ut 
instrumentum redderes" ("if I pay you so that you give me back 
something deposited with you, a document for instance"). 
 
107 Cf. Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, p. 194; Kaser, Das römische 
Privatrecht II, p. 377; Schulz, Classical Roman Law, p. 476. 
108 But cf. Evans-Jones, "From `undue transfer' to `retention without a legal basis' (the 
condictio indebiti and the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam)", in: Evans-Jones, ed., 
The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland, p. 220. 
109 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 841 sqq. 
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The implication is clear: unless I pay you, you will not return the document. 
As indicated above, this was already regarded as a transfer ob turpem causam 
in classical law, since infamia attached to the party who asked for the payment 
to return the object.110 According to D.12.5.9pr, this condictio is also available 
"Si vestimenta utenda tibi commodavero, deinde pretium, ut reciperem, 
dedissem)" ("If I lend you clothes for use and then pay you a price to 
get them back"). 
Initially this case did not involve infamia and was not regarded as a datio ob 
rem turpem. The compilers, however, seem to have viewed it differently.111 
The last of these examples is D.12.5.9.1, which deals with the situation where 
a payment was made to receive something which was in any event owed under 
a will or stipulation.112 
The final category of cases of compulsion dealt with in D. 12.5 concerns 
the situation where a transfer is made so that someone does not commit a 
crime. In a certain sense this is the converse of the former category: it is not a 
question of a person being obliged to do something, but rather being obliged 
not do something, such as not to commit murder, theft or sacrilege.113 The 
above cases of compulsion should be distinguished from cases rather 
amounting to bribery. Here the claim is normally excluded in any event: after 
all, both the parties are tainted by the turpitude. Notable examples are where a 
judge is paid to pronounce in someone's favour,114 where an adulterer buys his 
way out,115 and where a runaway slave pays to prevent disclosure of his 
 
110 Cf. Kaser, "Rechtswidrigkeit und Sittenwidrigkeit im klassichen römischen Recht", 
60 (1940) ZSS (RA) 95, 116. 
111 Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassischen römischen Recht, p. 174. 
112 It should be noted though that this condictio was "residual" in nature. If a payment 
was made, but this payment was undue because there had to be release in terms of the law of 
hire, sale or mandate, then actions from those areas of the law were available. Cf. Paul. D. 
12.5.9.1. 
113 Ulp. D. 12.5.2.1 ("ut puta dedi tibi ne sacrilegium facias, ne furtum, ne hominem 
occidas"). 
114 Ulp. D. 12.5.2.2. 
115 Ulp. D. 12.5.4. 
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whereabouts or his crimes.116 As far as the measure of recovery is concerned, 
the recipient was exposed to a claim aimed at recovery of the object (or its 
value), and its fruits or accessions,117 but not interest.118 Recovery was 
excluded in cases of turpitudo solius dantis, i.e. where only the pursuer was 
tainted with turpitude,119 and in cases where the "in pari delicto" or "in pari 
turpitudine" rules applied, i.e. where both the claimant and the recipient were 
tainted with turpitude.120 Recovery was obviously allowed in cases of 
turpitudo solius accipientis, i.e. where the turpitude was only on the side of the 
recipient.121 
3.3  The relationship between the condictiones and the metus remedies  
This overview of the treatment of the condictiones can be concluded by some 
brief remarks on their relationship with the metus remedies. Classical lawyers 
were notorious for not creating new remedies if it was at all possible to use 
existing ones.122 There are indications in D.12.5.7 that a condictio could be 
 
116 Ulp. D. 12.5.4; 12.5.5 (on which see Daube, "Turpitude in Digest 12.5.5", in: Studies 
in Roman Law in Memory of A. Arthur Schiller, pp. 33 sqq., especially in regard to the 
question whether the text concerns a condictio furtiva). The situation referred to above should 
be distinguished from the situation where A gives B something in order that B should supply 
information as to A's runaway slave or as to a thief of A's goods (Ulp. D. 12.5.4.4). As Daube 
puts it" "To want a remuneration for helping the master of a fugitive or one who has suffered a 
theft is not by itself dishonourable, at least not to a legally relevant degree. Detectives and 
slave-catchers live on it" (Turpitude in Digest 12.5.5", in: Studies in Roman Law in Memory 
of A. Arthur Schiller, p. 33). 
117 Glück, Pandecten, vol. 12 ad D. 12.5, p. 64; De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, p. 22; Paul D. 12.6.15 pr; Paul. D. 12.6.65.5; Paul. D. 12.4.7.1 and 
Paul D. 12.4.12 are applied analogously. 
118 Glück, Pandecten, vol. 12 ad D. 12.5, p. 64, De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, p. 22, n. 16, relying on C.4.7.4. 
119 For example, payments to a prostitute (Paul. D. 12.5.3; cf. the discussion in 
Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 847 sq., esp. n. 91). 
120 Cf. Ulp. D. 12.5.2.2; Ulp. D. 12.5.4; Paul. D. 12.5.3; Paul. D. 12.5.8; Ulp. D. 
50.17.154; C. 4.7.2. For discussion, see Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 846 sqq. 
121 Paul. D. 12.5.1.2; Ulp. D. 12.5.4.2; Glück, Pandecten, vol. 12 ad D. 12.5, p. 61. 
122 Cf. Von Lübtow, Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa gestum erit", p. 304. 
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used to recover extorted transfers (albeit to a limited extent). So why were the 
praetorian metus remedies created, and the condictio not developed further?123 
A number of reasons present themselves. Firstly, the condictio initially applied 
to a very limited category of transactions.124 Secondly, the condictio was in 
any event excluded where there was scientia or knowledge that a transfer is 
not due. It is only after the metus remedies were introduced that the victim 
could possibly avail himself of the rather artificial argument that he was 
ignorant of the exceptio metus.125 Thirdly, the condictio could in any event not 
provide relief against third parties, particularly where a claim was made 
against the heir of a person who obtained goods on grounds of compulsion. 
The condictio was not aimed at restoring to a previous position (restituere 
oportere), but at dare facere oportere, which was not something one would 
expect a judge to grant in the light of the general protection afforded to 
heirs.126 However, probably the most important explanation is the limited 
scope of the metus remedies - the strict standards of fortitude created room for 
a remedy which could be applied in less serious cases of compulsion. Through 
an analysis based on turpitude, the condictio could be made available.127 But 
from a post-classical perspective, the fact that there may have been an overlap 
in fields of application is not really significant: the recognition of D.12.5.7 in 
addition to the praetorian action contained in D.4.2 was fully in line with the 
Byzantine practice to duplicate remedies.128 
 
123 Cf. J. von Koschembahr-Lyskowski, Die Condictio als Bereicherungsklage im 
klassischen römischen Recht, vol. II (Weimar, 1907), p. 6. Von Lübtow does not believe that 
Pomp. D. 12.5.7 is of classical origin (Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa gestum erit", p. 
314). 
124 Pomp. D. 12.5.7 only applies to the stipulatio. 
125 Cf. text to n. 100 supra. 
126 Levy, Privatstrafe und Schadensersatz im klassischen römischen Recht, p. 92 sq.; 
Von Lübtow, Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa gestum erit", p. 304 sq. 
127 Josef Kohler, Lehrbuch des Bürgerlichen Rechts (Berlin, 1906), vol. 1, pp. 518 sqq.; 
Von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts, vol. 3, p. 107 n. (r). Cf. Dawson, 
"Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law", 1937 (11) Tulane Law 
Review 345, 347 sq. 
128 Von Lübtow, Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa gestum erit", pp. 315 sq. ("Die 
Byzantiner liebten es, nach dem Grundsatz: "doppelt hält besser" dem Kläger Rechtsmittel in 
Hülle und Fülle zur Verfügung zu stellen"). 
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4.  COMPULSION AND REMEDIES OF PROPERTY LAW 
Implicit in a lot of what has been discussed above is the assumption that the 
person who acquired something as a consequence of metus, or some other 
form of compulsion, became owner thereof. The question was then whether 
this position could be reversed by granting a praetorian remedy based on 
metus129, or a condictio. To complete the overview of the Roman law of 
compulsion, the effect of compulsion on the transfer of ownership needs to be 
examined more closely. 
In classical Roman law certain modes of derivative acquisition of 
ownership130 such as the more ancient and formal mancipatio and in iure 
cessio were abstract. In other words, it was not required that acquisition should 
be supported by a causa, such as payment in terms of a valid agreement.131 
However, this was apparently not the case with traditio, which was a more 
informal mode of acquisition. Here the dominant view is that in classical law 
the transfer of ownership had to be supported by a iusta causa traditionis, such 
as a valid agreement of sale.132 Apparently payment or solutio was regarded as 
a valid causa in itself: a transfer made with a view towards payment of a debt 
was therefore regarded as validly supported by a causa, even if the debt turned 
 
129 On the distinction between obtaining an order that the wrongdoer should restore, and 
obtaining automatic restitution of ownership, cf. Kupisch, In integrum restitutio und 
vindicatio utilis bei Eigentumsübertragungen im klassischen römischen Recht, pp. 1 sqq. 
130 On the different modes of acquisition and the distinction between quiritary and 
bonitary ownership in Roman law, see Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 400 sqq.; 
Schulz, Classical Roman law, pp. 338 sq.; Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, pp. 66 
sqq., 116 sqq.; Thomas, Textbook of Roman law, pp. 136 sqq.; Honsell (et al.), Römisches 
Recht, pp. 156 sqq.; Ankum and Pool, "Rem in bonis meis esse and rem in bonis meam esse - 
Traces of the Development of Roman Double Ownership", in: Essays for Barry Nicholas, pp. 
5 sqq. 
131 Cf. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 416 sqq.; Zimmermann, The Law of 
Obligations, pp. 271 sq., 841 sq.  
132 Cf. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 416 sqq.; Kaser, "Zur in integrum 
restitutio, besonders wegen metus und dolus", (1977) 94 ZSS (RA), 123, 138 sqq.; 
Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 271 sq., 841 sq. For critical assessment see D. F. 
Pugsley, "Was iusta causa necessary for traditio in Roman law?", 1974 (37) THRHR, 13; 
Gordon, "The Importance of the iusta causa of traditio", in: Essays for Barry Nicholas, pp. 
123 sqq.; Evans-Jones and MacCormack, "Iusta causa traditionis", in: Essays for Barry 
Nicholas, pp. 99 sqq. 
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out to be undue.133 How did all of this fit in the law relating to compulsion? As 
far as metus is concerned, there are indications that where ownership was 
transferred under compulsion, the praetor provided a rescissory action in the 
form of an actio in rem on the model of the rei vindicatio.134 This remedy 
apparently was available as an alternative to the actio quod metus causa.135 
The wrongdoer's acquisition of rights of (quiritary)136 ownership could then be 
thwarted by the actio in rem. In the case of the compelled mancipatio, the 
victim apparently had a choice between the rescissory rei vindicatio and the 
actio quod metus causa.137 In the case of the compelled traditio, the position is 
more complicated. If the traditio was compelled, but the underlying causa 
such as an agreement of sale was valid, the relief did not lie with the actiones 
in rem or quod metus causa, but rather with the lex Julia de vi privata.138 
 
133 Cf. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I, pp. 416 sqq.; Kaser, "Zur in integrum 
restitutio, besonders wegen metus und dolus", (1977) ZSS 138 sqq. 
134 Kupisch, In integrum restitutio und vindicatio utilis bei Eigentumsübertragungen im 
klassischen römischen Recht, pp. 134 sqq.; Kaser, "Zur in integrum restitutio, besonders 
wegen metus und dolus", (1977) 94 ZSS 138 sqq.; Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, 
p. 656, n. 46. 
135 In Ulp. D 4.2.9.6 it is stated that "... although we think that an action in rem is to be 
granted because the property belongs to the person ("quia res in bonis eius est") on whom 
force has been brought to bear, it is still said, not without reason, that if anyone should bring 
an action for fourfold, the action in rem ceases; and the reverse is also true". But cf. Von 
Lübtow, Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa gestum erit", pp. 120 sqq., 255 sq. He states that it 
is the Edict's consequence of "ratum non habebo" which provides the victim with a "fictional 
rei vindicatio" and so restores his ownership. The action seems to be regarded as part of the 
relief provided by the actio quod metus causa, rather than a separate remedy. 
136 Although the wrongdoer obtained quiritary ownership, it is possible that the victim 
may still have retained bonitary ownership. On the possibility that the victim may still have 
retained rights of bonitary ownership, see Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, 
pp. 127 sqq.; Kupisch, In integrum restitutio und vindicatio utilis bei 
Eigentumsübertragungen im klassischen römischen Recht, pp. 222 sqq. 
137 Cf. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 127 sqq. on the validity of 
the compelled mancipatio. 
138 Cf. Ulp. D. 4.2.12.2; Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 166 sq. On 
the position if the underlying agreement of sale was extorted, but not the traditio, see 
C. 2.19.4. Hartkamp argues that this is indicative of a confirmation of the transfer, and an 
abandonment of the praetorian remedies (Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 50 sq.). 
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However, if the underlying agreement was extorted as well, the validity of the 
causa and the validity of the transfer became questionable. In classical law, 
this may very well have meant that ownership did not pass.139 In post-classical 
law, where traditio became the dominant mode of derivative acquisition, the 
position could have been similar, but this is by no means clear.140 When one 
briefly moves on to the effect of compulsion on the validity of transfers in the 
context of the condictio, the picture is more simple. It has been indicated 
above that in post-classical law the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam 
could be used to recover certain transfers made under compulsion, most 
notably where a person used actual threats (vis), or implied threats (e.g. by 
stating that he will not do something he is supposed to do, unless the victim 
does something in turn). The question as to whether this compulsion was 
sufficiently serious to affect the transfer of ownership is not hard to answer. In 
these cases there was clearly no concurrence between the condictio and 
remedies of property law such as the rei vindicatio. Even though a transfer 
made under an extorted stipulation could be regarded as having been tainted 
with turpitude, the turpitude did not prevent the passage of ownership.141 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
1.  Early Roman private law was not well adapted to provide relief to 
victims of compulsion: the general rule was that compelled acts were 
valid. It was only in certain cases that a judge could provide relief by 
relying on considerations of good faith. Given the tumultuous social 
and political conditions in Republican Rome, it was up to the praetor to 
remedy this deficiency. The first reform was contained in a formula 
Octaviana, of which the exact contents is unclear. Apparently, it was 
aimed at enabling recovery of what had been taken, or what was given 
under force and (or) fear ("per vim et (aut) metum"). At the time, the 
 
139 Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 178 sq. 
140 Ulp. D. 4.2.9.6 indicates that ownership does not pass, but see Hartkamp, Der Zwang 
im römischen Privatrecht, pp. 178 sq.; Von Lübtow, Der Ediktstitel "Quod metus causa 
gestum erit", p. 13; and generally Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht II, pp. 282 sqq. 
141 Cf. Liebs, "The History of the Roman Condictio up to Justinian", in: Essays for Tony 
Honoré, p. 174; Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, p. 845, n. 74. Ownership also passed with 
the transfer of money (Kaser, "Das Geld im römischen Sachenrecht", (1961) 29 Tijdschrift 
voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 220). 
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actio vi bonorum raptorum was also introduced, which was a specific 
action against robbery. Further legislative relief was provided in the 
form of a lex Julia de vi privata, which imposed criminal punishment 
in cases of self-help, and the leges repetundarum, which were 
specifically aimed against magistrates who enriched themselves by 
extorting bribes. The decretum divi Marci punished a creditor with the 
loss of his claim if he engaged in self-help, regardless of whether a 
debt was due. 
2.  From a modern perspective the most important Roman remedy 
against compulsion is to be found in the Edictum perpetuum of 
Hadrian. According to the Edict the praetor would not uphold what is 
done as a consequence of fear ("quod metus causa gestum erit, ratum 
non habebo"). The Edict did not encompass physical bodily force 
which completely excludes any decision of will of the victim (in 
mediaeval terms, vis absoluta), but rather compulsion through 
"bending" the will of the victim ("mental" fear or vis compulsiva). It 
was also required that the fear had to be caused by wrongful means, 
and had to be serious enough to move a homo constantissimus. The 
meaning of the words "ratum non habebo" in the Edict is unclear, but 
it seems as if the following relief was provided. If the victim was faced 
with a claim of enforcement he could ward it off with the exceptio 
metus. If he had already made a compelled transfer and wanted 
restitution, he could institute the actio quod metus causa. It is disputed 
whether this remedy, which exposed the wrongdoer to a penalty of 
fourfold damages if he did not provide restitution, was aimed at 
obtaining in integrum restitutio (propter metum), or whether in 
integrum restitutio was a separate remedy.  
3.  Under certain circumstances compulsion could also give rise to a 
condictio - a remedy aimed at recovery of a specific amount or object. 
In classical law the condictio could apparently be used to recover a 
transfer made in fulfillment of a compelled stipulation. In Justinianic 
law, which was characterised by a fragmentation of the condictio, it 
was the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam which was singled 
out for the fulfillment of this function. This condictio was aimed at the 
recovery of transfer which were made for a future purpose which 
succeeded, but where the retention of the transfer was unacceptable 
because it was tainted by turpitude. Examples of cases of compulsion 
where the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam was used towards 
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this end are where a transfer was made to a person so that he would do 
what he was supposed to do in any event, such as to return goods 
which were deposited with him or loaned to him, or to refrain from 
committing a crime. In this limited context, through recourse to notions 
of turpitude, the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam could be 
applied in cases of compulsion not coverred by the praetorian metus 
remedies. The condictio indebiti was particularly suited for the 
recovery of transfers made in order to pay a debt (solvendi causa), but 
which failed, because no debt was due. It was apparently not used in 
cases where undue transfers were obtained by compulsion. This can be 
ascribed to the prominence of the error requirement in post-classical 
law. 
4.  Compulsion could further give rise to remedies of property law, 
most notably a rescissory action in the form of an actio in rem. 
